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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15551 
FREDRICK WILLIAM ALBERT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with theft as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (c) (1953), as amended, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
a Class A misdemeanor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant pled guilty to the crime as charged in 
the information and was sentenced to serve six (6) months 
in the Duchesne County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment 
of the court below. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 26, 1977, appellant appeared for 
arraignment before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court. Appellant was 
not represented by counsel because he had been unable to 
pay his attorney a retainer fee and his attorney therefore 
refused to appear without payment of the fee (T.1,2). 
Appellant nevertheless attempted to enter a 
guilty plea, but the court refused to entertain the plea 
until appellant was represented by counsel (T.2). 
The prosecuting attorney then asked the court, 
"If they confer with counsel today, may this come back 
on at the end of the calendar?" (T.2). 
Appellant conferred with attorney George E. 
Mangan and the matter came before the court again (T.20). 
At this proceeding appellant entered a plea of guilty 
(T. 4) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY DETERMINED THAT 
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS BOTH VOLUNTARY AND GIVEN WITH AN 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA. 
The constitutional standard for the taking of 
a guilty plea is set out in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 
-2-
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(1968), which requires a court both to advise a defendant 
of the several constitutional rights that will be waived 
by entry of a guilty plea and to determine that the 
appellant's plea is being given voluntarily and with an 
understanding of its consequences. 
In the present case appellant appeared in court 
with William Lester Mach, who had participated in the 
theft with appellant and who had been charged with the 
same crime. Mr. Mach also had been initially represented 
by Mr. Van Seiver. Mr. Mach's case was called up first 
and the court conducted the following interrogation: 
"THE COURT: To the charge 
contained in the information what 
is your plea? 
MR. MACH: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MACH: 
THE COURT: 
have you had? 
MR. MACH: 
THE COURT: 
write? 
Guilty. 
How old are you? 
Thirty one. 
How much schooling 
High school. 
Can you read and 
MR. MACH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand that 
the penalty for this offense is up to 
a year in the Duchesne County jail? 
MR. MACH: I do. 
THE COURT: Have you seen the 
inside of the Duchesne County jail? 
MR. MACH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You still want to 
plead guilty? 
MR. MACH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand you have 
the right to compel the county attorney 
to prove everything contained in this 
charge against you to a jury of eight 
people and beyond a reasonable doubt? j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. MACH: I du. 
THE COURT: And you are 
asking me to let you waive that 
right? 
MR. MACH: Yes. 
THE COURT: You have a right 
to appeal that decision if it 
should be against you to the 
Supreme Court of this State. 
MR. MACH: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are asking me 
to let you waive that right, is 
that correct? 
MR. MACH. Yes. 
THE COURT: By entering a 
plea of guilty, you understand, 
you are doing more than just 
admitting the offense. You are 
entering that kind of verdict 
against yourself. Do you under-
stand that? 
MR. MACH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Has anybody 
promised you anything for entering 
a plea of guilty? 
MR. MACH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Has anybody made 
any threats against you as to what 
would happen if you didn't enter 
a plea of guilty? 
MR. MACH: No. 
THE COURT: Do you have any 
reason to think the court would 
pronounce a different kind of 
judgment if you pleaded guilty 
than it would if you were tried 
and found guilty? 
MR. MACH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: What happened 
that makes you want to plead guilty? 
What did you do that brought this 
charge against you? 
MR. MACH: I had some stolen 
property in my possession. 
-4-
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-THE COURT: 
that tirne that 
MR. MACH: 
that, yes. 
Did you know at 
it was stolen? 
Shortly prior to 
THE COURT: What was the 
property? 
MR. MACH: A lamp and a chandelier. 
THE COURT: The court finds that 
the defendant is understandingly and 
voluntarily offering to enter a plea 
of guilty and directs entry of that 
plea." (T.6-8). 
Immediately following the Mach matter, the 
appellant's case was called up and the court conducted 
the following inquiry: 
"THE COURT: 
contained in the 
is your plea? 
MR. ALBERT: 
Honor. 
THE COURT: 
transactions? 
MR. DRANEY: 
MR. MANGAN: 
THE COURT: 
Mach I take it? 
To the charge 
information what 
Guilty, Your 
Were these the same 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Yes. 
You were with Mr. 
MR. ALBERT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Did you hear the 
questions I asked him about his wishes 
to enter a plea of guilty? 
MR. ALBERT: Yes, sir, I did. 
THE COURT: Would any of your 
answers to those questions be any 
different? 
MR. ALBERT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: The court finds the 
defendant is voluntarily offering to 
enter a plea of guilty and directs the 
clerk to enter that plea." (T.4). 
Although the court did not conduct an extensive 
interrogation of appellant, Judge Sorensen was satisfied 
that appellant had listened to the questions asked and 
-s-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
responses given in the Mach case and that appellant would 
have given the same responses. Satisfied that appellant 
was pleading voluntarily and understood the consequences 
of his plea, the court accepted the guilty plea. 
Respondent submits that the questioning of 
appellant in conjunction with the detailed interrogation 
reflected in the record of the companion matter meets 
the Boykin standard. 
POINT II 
UTAH CASE LAW CONCERNING DISTRICT COURTS' 
APPLICATION OF BOYKIN V. ALABAMA,395 U.S. 238 (1968), 
ADEQUATELY PROTECTSADEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
DURING THE TAKING OF A GUILTY PLEA. 
Respondent rejects the notion that Utah should 
adopt Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(attached as Exhibit "A"), in order to safeguard a 
defendant's rights when a guilty plea is offered. If a 
new statute is required, the Utah legislature is the 
appropriate body to consider and impose such a statute. 
However, respondent contends that adoption of Rule 11 is 
not required to dispose of this case and that the court 
should limit its ruling to the more narrow issue of 
the trial court's compliance with Boykin, supra, Strong v. 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969), and 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977). These latter 
-6-
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Utah cases are state interpreations of Boykin, supra, 
and requi~e that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, 
without undue influence or coercion and that the ends 
of justice be served by not allowing a person to enter 
a plea of guilty to a crime he did not commit. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY 
COUNSEL. 
Although appellant's former attorney, Robert 
Van Seiver, did not appear at the arraignment, he had 
previously consulted with his client. (See Exhibit "B".) 
II MR. ALBERT: • • • We were 
in his office yesterday afternoon 
and talked with him at the time ••• 
And that he informed us of what was 
going to take place. There was a 
reduction in the charge if we were 
to come over here and waive our 
preliminary and plead guilty and 
be able to get it taken care of 
without his presence." (T.2). 
In spite of appellant's willingness to enter his 
plea without an appearance by his attorney, the trial 
court refused to allow such a plea. The record is silent 
on the circumstances of the hiring of attorney George 
Mangan, although appellant's brief (page 8) indicates 
that Mr. Mangan happened to be in the courtroom on other 
business. Appellant conferred with Mangan and was 
accompanied by him when he returned to the courtroom to 
offer his plea. 
-7-
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Although appellant suggests that these 
facts are remarkably similar to those of Alires v. 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969), a close 
analysis reveals that the only real similarity is 
that both cases involve a guilty plea. Alires had 
had no prior contact with an attorney and the one 
appointed in the courtroom exhibited no interest in 
the case beyond his $100 fee and did not even remember 
at sentencing that he represented Alires. In the 
present case, such egregious facts are wholly absent. 
Appellant's unsupported allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel does not meet his burden of 
persuading the court that counsel failed in some 
manner to represent his interests. This Court 
considered the issue in State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 
337 (Utah 1977), and made these remarks concerning 
Forsyth's complaint: 
"It is not at all uncommon 
for one who finds himself in 
such trouble or having been 
found or pleaded guilty to a 
crime to turn upon and impute 
fault to one who has 
previously tried to assist him. 
But the mere assertion of such 
a charge does not prove the fact. 
This is especially so because 
the assertion is suffused with 
such self-interest. 
560 P.2d at 339. 
-8-
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Beyond his unsubstantiated complaint, appellant 
has offered no evidence to support his claim, and 
respondent urges the Court to reject it. 
CONCLUSION 
As appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered 
his guilty plea and received adequate, effective assistance 
of counsel, respondent asks the Court to affirm the judgment 
of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEA~IBR 
Deputy Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-9-
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EXIIII3IT "A" 
PLEAS Rule 11 
Rule 11. Pleas 
(;;) Alternati;'e~. A defendant m:ty 1,lead not guilty, guilty, or 
no!o contcndere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant 
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(h) Nolo Contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere 
only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted 
by the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties 
and the interest of the public in the effective administration of jus-
tice. 
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in 
open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, 
the following: 
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the 
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the 
maximum possible penalty provided by law; and 
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that 
he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage 
of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be ap-
pointed to represent him; and 
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in 
that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right 
to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the as-
sistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to in-
criminate himself; and 
( 4) that if he pleads guilty or no lo contendere there will not 
be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo 
contendere he waives the right to a trial; and 
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo ccntendere, the court may 
ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, 
and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and 
in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used 
against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement. 
(d) Insuring Th .. t the Plea b Voluntary. The court shall not 
accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by address-
ing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea 
is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises 
apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to 
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo con-
tendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the 
government and the defendant or his attorney. 
15 
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(e) Pl~a Agreement Procedure. 
(1) In General. The atlurney for the government and the 
attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se 
may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agree-
ment that, upon the entering of a pica of guilty or nolo con-
tendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, 
the attorney for the government will do any of the following: 
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or 
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the 
defcndant"s request, for a particular sentence, with the 
understanding that such recommendation or request shall 
not be binding upon the court; or 
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate dis-
position of the case. 
The court shall not participate in any such discussions. 
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been 
reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require 
the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing 
of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. There-
upon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer 
its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has 
been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. 
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the com-t accepts 
the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it 
will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition pro-
vided for in the plea agreement. 
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the 
plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties 
of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, 
on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not 
bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the oppor-
tunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that 
if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the 
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant 
than that contemplated by the plea agreement. 
(5) Time of Pica Agreement Procedure. Except for good 
cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a plea 
agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other 
time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court. 
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related 
Statements. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, 
evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo 
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to 
16 
'! 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PLEAS Rule 11 
the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in 
connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas 01· 
offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding 
against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evi-
dence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, 
a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contenderc, or 
an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged 
or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal procee<ling for 
perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the de-
fendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of coun-
sel. 
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the accept-
ance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon 
such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there 
is a factual basis for the plea. 
(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceed-
ings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there 
is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the record shall include, with-
out limitation, the court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into 
the voluntariness of the pica including any plea agreement, and the 
inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea. 
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 19GG; Apr. 22, 1974; July 31, 
1975, Pub.L. 94-64, § 3(5)-(10), 89 Stat. 371, 372. 
Historical Note 
'Effedin· ])ate of An1endm~nt8 Propose1l of tJii! public in the e£fedl\'"e administr::1-
A11r. 2:?, 19':'.t; Efrt"<"th·t!> nato of 1975 
Am~nJme-nh. Ame11dmeuts of this rule 
crnhLaced In the ordl•r of the 1Jnlted 
St:.ites Supreme Court on Apr. 22, 197-1, 
rind the nmendtnents of this rule mnde 
l.ly set·tion 3 of Puh.L. 94--04, cf!ecth·e 
Dec. 1, 19i5, exePpt with respe<'t to the 
a111endmeut adding suht.l. (e) (6) ot this 
rule, dfectiYe Aug. 1, 1075, see seetion 2 
at Pub.L. !»--04, :i;:et out as a 11ote under 
rule 4 or the>ie rule11. 
Noteit of Commlttf"6 on th~ Judiciary, 
J1011<;0 R~r1ort ~o. 9l-'.!.i7. A. Aua•ntl-
Jnl'l\t'i l"ropo1'!t"tl liy the Suprt"me Court. 
nule 11 of the Fedcrul Rules of Criminal 
Procedure deals with pleas. The Su· 
preme Court hus proposf'd to amend this 
r11le extensively. 
Rule 11 pro,·ld~s thnt a defendant nilly 
ple.'ld guilty, not guilty, or nolo conten-
dere. The ~uprerne Court's .amendments 
f() Rule ll(b) pro\.-ide that n nolo con-
ten<ll're plea "tdiall be acl'ellled by the 
court only nfte>r due considerntion of 
the \"fews or the pnrties anti the intC'rest 
tion of ju~tke." 
The Supreme Court ~men1Jments to Rule 
JJ(c) spell out the fUlYi<'e thnt lhe court 
must gi,·e to the defendnut before nc-
l"<'I>fing the dc!eudnnt's plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere. The Supreme Court 
ameudments to Uuie ll(d) s:et forth the 
ste-ps thnt the court mu!it take to h.1sure 
that a i;uHty or llolo conteodere plea has 
hcen \'ohmtnrily mude. 
The Supreme Court an1endmcnts to 
Rule l l (e) estnblish a plea ni;::rel'IPent 
prnccdnrl". This procedure permits lhE" 
partit-s to <liscu~s dispi)sing Q! a t:ase 
without n trin1 nud sch forth Ute type 
or ngreements th:tt tho parties cart rea«:h 
ronct>-rning the di~positfon o! the <"3se. 
'.fhe procedure is not mAndntvrY; n court 
I,; frl"e not to permit the parties to pre-
:i;:ent J>lt>a n.i::~ementR to it. 
The Supreme Court amendments to 
Rule ll(f) require thnt the courc. before 
entcriuK judJ,!'meut upon fl plea of 1Z11ilty, 
s:..ti~!r itself tl1nt .. there Is a f;1ctuo.I 
hnsls for the pll"n." The Supreme Court 
17 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Dl':NI-TTS L. ORAm:y 
DUCH::SJ·i:': COUIITY it1.'TORNI·:Y 
Attornry for Pl2intiff 
P. o. no:: 188G 
f;.co.:e,J''.~ l.L:.: lYt~ 8.1~.0GG 
(POl) 'U2_=1CG1 
'.·D1~=<1;:µ,i.i:.; ,10 .X...T.N 
HVJ,[1 ao ~·UV.LS 
HJ TI IE JU.STICE COURT O? J:'IIE STi\. TE Ol'' U'r:'.I-1, ROOSEVELT PRECINCT 
TH~ ST\TS OF U1.~H, 
PL1in'.::iff, 
-vs-
?R:-:DRICK \'iILLI!'cT·l ,\LBS!\T, 
Def ondanc. 
\'IAIVER OP PRELH1IH\!\Y 
HE,\ RING 
Crir:iinal i!e>. 2 J. 7 
Cones no1·1 the Def end ant Fredrick ~lilliam Albert, 
bein<J represented by hj_s <J.ttorney, Robert Van Seiver, ;:i.nd 
beinrJ fully advised of his rights to a Preliminary Hearing 
on the charge in this matter, and does hereby waive his right 
to s2.id hearing. 
D~TED this 26~ d~y of October, 1977. 
H.OH~~H'r °'i~·'..t! SC.LVf~R 
Attorney for Defcnd2nt 
STGNED before r.1e this 2Gth day of Oc-tober, 1977. 
/J/_fJb;,{L 
.v-. ··,•rr"· O"' •rL"",-.,-f-,,-~-,-C-E·----y _ _.r., r r-.1.r.... 1~1'.. 
\ 
/ 
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